Adaptive Decision Making via Entropy Minimization by Allahverdyan, Armen E. et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
80
3.
06
63
8v
2 
 [p
hy
sic
s.d
ata
-an
]  
1 D
ec
 20
18
Adaptive Decision Making via Entropy Minimization
Armen E. Allahverdyan1), Aram Galstyan2), Ali E. Abbas3), and Zbigniew R. Struzik4,5) ∗
1)Yerevan Physics Institute, Alikhanian Brothers Street 2, Yerevan 375036, Armenia
2)USC Information Sciences Institute, 4676 Admiralty Way, Marina del Rey, CA 90292, USA
3)Industrial and Systems Engineering, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, USA,
4)Advanced Center for Computing and Communication,
RIKEN Institute, 2-1 Hirosawa, Wako-shi, 351-0198, Japan,
5)Graduate School of Education, The University of Tokyo,
7-3-1 Hongo, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo, 113-0033, Japan.
An agent choosing between various actions tends to take the one with the lowest cost. But this
choice is arguably too rigid (not adaptive) to be useful in complex situations, e.g., where exploration-
exploitation trade-off is relevant in creative task solving or when stated preferences differ from
revealed ones. Here we study an agent who is willing to sacrifice a fixed amount of expected utility
for adaptation. How can/ought our agent choose an optimal (in a technical sense) mixed action?
We explore consequences of making this choice via entropy minimization, which is argued to be a
specific example of risk-aversion. This recovers the ǫ-greedy probabilities known in reinforcement
learning. We show that the entropy minimization leads to rudimentary forms of intelligent behavior:
(i) the agent assigns a non-negligible probability to costly events; but (ii) chooses with a sizable
probability the action related to less cost (lesser of two evils) when confronted with two actions with
comparable costs; (iii) the agent is subject to effects similar to cognitive dissonance and frustration.
Neither of these features are shown by entropy maximization.
Keywords: prior probability, risk, entropy maximization/minimization, exploration-exploitation
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider an agent who has to choose between a number of different actions A1, ...,An. Before taking action,
consequences of each action Ak are subjectively estimated to have the cost εk (or the utility uk = −εk). The basic
tenet of decision theory is that the agent ought to choose the action that minimizes the cost (or maximizes the
utility) [1]. In terms of probabilities pk for various actions (pk ≥ 0,
∑n
k=1 pk = 1), this amounts to taking the action
ℓ related to the least cost (if it exists and is available):
pℓ = 1, pk 6=ℓ = 0, εℓ < εk 6=ℓ, k = 1, ..., n. (1)
There are, however, situations where εk may change after actions are taken, also as a result of those actions
1. Here
is an example that points against choosing (1), and illustrates our problem. You got 100 eggs and several baskets,
which seem to have different durabilities (i.e. utilities). The probability with which an action, i.e. a basket, is taken
refers to the fraction of eggs in it. Even if the most durable basket may appear to support all the eggs, it is not wise
to put everything in one basket. First the durability of a basket can change due to very eggs inside of it. Second, the
durability can change unexpectedly due to hindrances. Third, you loose the possibility to explore other baskets that
may turn out to be more durable than you thought. Let us now mention several more, broadly defined situations,
where “putting all eggs into one basket” is not good.
– In reinforcement learning the preliminary costs εk do change due to the actions taken [3]. Even if these changes
are assumed to be predictable, the agent still needs to make several actions before enough experience is accumulated.
– The exploration-exploitation dilemma is known in adaptive (biological, organizational, social) systems; see [4, 5]
for reviews. Exploring possibilities that seem inferior from a local viewpoint may provide advantages in the long
run. Exploitation (in the narrow sense) makes the choice that does seem optimal at the moment of choice. Broader
exploitation scenarios do account for adaptivity, but still concentrate on the most useful possibilities [5].
– In creative problem solving there are conceptually simple tasks which are nevertheless not easy to solve in practice
because solving them via the least cost (implied by the statement of the problem and/or the previous experience of the
solver) is a dead end [6–8]. This Einstellung effect is one of the main hindrances of human creativity [6–8]. Creative
tasks can be solved only if (subjectively) less probable ways are looked at [6, 7].
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1 See section II for more details. We stress that we do not mean the delayed reward situation, where the utility is constant, but is
discounted by some known factor, because the action is performed now, while its reward will come in future.
2How to assign prior probabilities to avoid the strictly deterministic (1)? Such probabilities should hold a natural
constraint that actions related to higher cost are getting smaller probabilities. Two ad hoc solutions are especially
simple: one can take into account only the second-best action, or take all non-best actions with the same (small)
probability. In reinforcement learning the latter prior probability is known as the ǫ-greedy [3]. It is preferable to have
a regular method of choosing non-deterministic probabilities, which will reflect people’s attitudes towards the decision
making in an uncertain situation, and which will include the above ad hoc solutions as particular cases.
Here we explore the possibility of defining the prior probabilities via risk minimization (or maximization); see [9, 10]
for reviews on the notion of risk and its various interpretations. We assume that the agent first decides how much aver-
age utility E−mink[εk] he invests into exploration by going into nonoptimal—in the sense of not holding (1)—behavior.
We employ the notion of risk in a specific context, namely when comparing the behavior of agents having the same
utilities for various actions and the same value of E. We argue below that maximizing (minimizing) risk in this
specific situation can be done via maximizing (minimizing) the entropy −
∑n
k=1 pk ln pk. People demonstrate both
risk minimization (aversion) and maximization (seeking) [12, 25], though the risk in those situations is a less specific
(and more difficult to describe) notion—first because it involves agents having different utilities for same actions, and
second because it involves a difference between the monetary value (gain or loss) and its utility.
Our results show that there are important behavioral differences between entropy-minimizing and entropy-
maximizing agents. They are seen for at least three different actions (and the same E). The entropy-minimizing agent
implements risk-aversion by weighting the least-cost action more, but he also assigns a non-negligible probability for
the high-cost action—whereas the entropy-maximizing agent ignores it. The extent to which the high-cost action is
accounted for by the entropy-minimizing agent depends on the amount of utility invested into exploration: investing
more utility leads to assigning less probability. As we argue below, this closely relates with the notion of cognitive
dissonance [60, 61]. Another feature is frustration: due to competing local minima of entropy, the entropy-minimizing
agent can abruptly change the action probabilities as a result of a small change of E. Also, when confronted with two
actions with different, but comparable costs, the entropy-minimizing agent tends to select the one with a smaller cost
(chooses the lesser of two evils), while the entropy-maximizing agent simply does not distinguish between them. The
important point is that for a risk-minimizing agent (which does a constrained minimization of a concave function in a
convex domain) choosing the probabilities of actions means selecting between several local minima. In contrast, the
risk-seeking agent always has a unique and well-defined probabilistic solution that results from minimizing a convex
function [13]. We relate the above features of the entropy-minimizing agent with a rudimentary form of intelligence
(see Section VII).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II explains the statement of our problem. Section III
discusses stochastic dominance, risk, majorization and its relation with entropy. In particular, Section IIID provides
general remarks and references on entropy optimization. The reader who agrees from the outset with entropy as a
measure of risk (and uncertainty) can consult Sections II and III very briefly. The next two sections, IV and V, present
details of (resp.) entropy minimization and maximization. The latter may seem to be standard, but Section V still
contains salient points that are frequently overlooked. Section VI compares entropy maximization and minimization
scenarios from the viewpoint of the agent’s behavior. We summarize in Section VII.
II. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
A. Costs and constraints
Let us explain the above problem. An agent faces different actions {Ak}
n
k=1 with (resp.) costs {εk}
n
k=1. These costs
are subjective estimates of future consequences of actions made by the agent before deciding on those actions. After
taking several actions, the agent can change his estimates also as a result of the actions taken. However, before taking
actions he does not know in which specific way the costs will change. In such an agnostic situation, the agent faces
two normative demands—he should behave according to {εk}
n
k=1, but he also should also explore all actions. Hence
he decides to act via probabilities and implements two constraints. First, he decides to invest in the exploration of
the average utility E −mink[εk], where
E ≡
n∑
k=1
pk εk, pk ≥ 0,
n∑
k=1
pk = 1, (2)
and where pk are probabilities to be chosen. Within this formulation of the problem, we can regard E to be under
control of the agent.
Second, actions related to a lesser cost get higher probability:
(pk − pl)(εk − εl) ≤ 0. (3)
3Recall that costs are negative utilities. We work with costs, since this makes explicit the analogy with statistical
physics, where the cost corresponds to energy, and the natural tendency is to minimize the energy.2
We order the costs and probabilities as
ε1 < ε2 < .... < εn, (4)
p1 ≥ p2 ≥ ... ≥ pn. (5)
Note that the inequalities in (4) between costs are strict, since within the present study coinciding costs mean
coinciding actions. Hence once the actions are different, so should be the costs. The reason for insisting on non-equal
costs in (4) will be seen below.
B. Stated versus revealed preferences
We can look at this problem from a different angle. In human decision-making, it is known that preferences with
respect to different actions can be determined in laboratory conditions (e.g., via surveys). This then defines their costs
(negative utilities) (4). However, in reality (e.g., in complex conditions of a market) people generally do not strictly
follow these preferences due to lack of cognitive abilities, insufficient attention, lack of a decision time, the need of
an exploration behavior etc.. The difference between experimental and real-world choices is known as the problem of
stated versus revealed preferences; see [57] for a recent review. It is assumed in the psychology of choice that such
cases can be described by assigning probabilities to each costs [57]. Now, the above formulation does correspond to
this situation, where (5) is a natural constraint on probabilities, and where E −mink[εk] > 0 is not simply chosen by
the agent, but is also due to objective problems described above. For E−mink[εk]→ 0, the agent is back to choosing
the least-cost solution only.
C. Differences with respect to other models of decision theory
Above we described an agent who is uncertain about future consequences of his actions. Decision theory has models
for that situation. The classic model (by Savage and others) [1, 2, 12] assumes that at the moment of action-taking
there is an uncertain state of nature (environment) Sα to be realized from {Sα}
m
α=1 with probabilities {πα}
m
α=1, which
can be the agent’s subjective degrees of belief. These are called states of nature, since their future realization is
independent from the action taken, but an action Ai in a state Sα leads to consequences with costs ciα [1, 2, 12]. The
agent does know {πα}
m
α=1 and {ciα}
n m
i=1α=1. Now one criterion for looking for the best action is to choose i such that
the expected cost
∑m
α=1 παciα is minimized over i (i.e., the expected utility is maximized) [1, 2, 12].
The classic model has limitations—e.g., that environmental states {Sα}
m
α=1 are realized independently from actions.
There are many cases where this simplistic assumption does not hold. Causal decision theory [14–18] attempts to
remedy this problem, but creates its own issues—e.g., replacing πα by the conditional probability πα|i of the state
Sα given the action Ai leads to paradoxical (if not unacceptable) conclusions nicknamed “voodoo” decisions [16]. In
response, the expected utility principle was changed to the concept of ratifiability [2, 17], but this proposal has its own
problems [17], e.g.. it demands an unusual environment.3 Another response was to change the conditional probability
πα|i to the probability of conditional πα⇐i, which, in contrast to πα|i, is supposed to describe the causal influence of
the action Ai on Sα [14, 15]. But πα⇐i does not have a general definition [14], while some of its particular definitions
are flawed [18]. Recent reviews show that all non-classical models of causal decision theory are problematic in one
way or another [14, 17, 18].
Our statement of the problem refers to an agnostic agent that (as yet) does not know about possible consequences
of his actions in a complex and uncertain world. Even if he is going to learn about them, he still needs to perform
several actions with certain prior probabilities. We do not assume any specific mechanism by which uncertain states
of the world are realized and changed in response to actions. Hence, our model can be at best descriptional, but it
starts from two normative demands: behave according to your own estimated costs (4) and explore all actions.
2 Note that (3) is the standard condition of physical stability [19] Relations between statistical physics and decision theory are mentioned
in [20]. Ref. [21] discusses the maximum entropy method for elicitation of costs (utilities) from an incomplete data.
3 Ratifiability advises to take action Ai if for all j [2, 16, 17]: C(Aj |Ai) ≥ C(Ai|Ai), where C(Aj |Ai) ≡
∑
α piα|icjα. (Minimization of
the expected cost reads in this notation C(Aj |Aj) ≥ C(Ai|Ai).) This assumes an unusual environment: C(Aj |Ai) describes an agent
who commits to act Ai, conditionally constrains the environment by this commitment, but still keeps the freedom of acting Aj . The
ratifiability then means consistency between the commitment and the actual action.
4III. RISK AND ENTROPY
A. Stochastic dominance, risk and majorization
Together with probabilities p1, ..., pn in (2–5), we define another candidate probability with the same costs (4) and
holding the same constraints (2, 3) with the same value of E:
q1 ≥ q2 ≥ ... ≥ qn ≥ 0,
n∑
k=1
qk = 1, E =
n∑
k=1
qk εk. (6)
We ask for criteria that should make {pk}
n
k=1 more preferable than {qk}
n
k=1. The well-known criterion of choosing
for a smaller average cost obviously does not apply here. However, one can ask whether {pk}
n
k=1 is less risky than
{qk}
n
k=1.
We emphasize that risk is generally a complex notion that raises conceptual and practical (resp. normative and
descriptional) issues; see [9–12, 23–27, 54–56] for reviews from various viewpoints. Our application of risk will be to a
large extent free of those issues. There are two reasons for this. First, we do not focus on the difference between the
commodity and its utility (cost); hence we are not concerned with the problem of convex/concave utility functions
[12, 25]. Second, we always compare between lotteries (i.e., probabilities and their outcome costs) that are ordered
in the same way [cf. (6, 5)] and refer to the same costs (4). Then a stringent definition of risk goes via the stochastic
dominance condition4; see [1, 22] for reviews. A risk-averse agent can start with the largest possible cost εn and asks
for its p-probability pn to be not larger than the q-probability qn. Next, the p-probability pn + pn−1 of the cost to
be larger or equal to εn−1 is compared with the corresponding q-probability qn + qn−1 etc. We end up with n − 1
conditions
∑k
i=n pi ≤
∑k
i=n qi, or
k∑
i=1
pi ≥
k∑
i=1
qi, k = 1, ..., n− 1, (7)
so that if one of them holds strictly, then {pk}
n
k=1 is less risky than {qk}
n
k=1. We emphasize that the same n − 1
conditions (7) emerge with an alternative definition of risk, when the agent maximizes the probability of the best
outcome ε1 etc. So within the present definition it does not matter whether a risk-averse agent selects for higher
probabilities of lower-cost options, or for lower probabilities of higher-cost actions.
Due to (4, 5, 6), the stochastic dominance condition (7) coincides with the majorization condition [69].5
{pk}
n
k=1 ≻ {qk}
n
k=1. (8)
In particular, for any {pk}
n
k=1 we get {pk}
n
k=1 ≻ {qk =
1
n
}nk=1 (once qk holds the first condition in (6)), while
(1, 0, .., 0) ≻ {pk}
n
k=1. Thus, in the present situation we have a natural correspondence between risk and majorization.
B. Measure of risk and Schur-concave functions
According to (7), we have n − 1 different conditions; i.e., it is not a single number as a measure for risk.6 Hence
even if (7) holds, i.e., {qk}
n
k=1 is more risky that {pk}
n
k=1, we do not have any obvious way of quantifying this relation
via a single number or determine its approximate validity.
A more serious drawback of (7) is that for many interesting cases the risk is simply not defined, since neither
{pk}
n
k=1 ≻ {qk}
n
k=1 holds nor {qk}
n
k=1 ≻ {pk}
n
k=1:
{pk}
n
k=1 6≻ {qk}
n
k=1 and {qk}
n
k=1 6≻ {pk}
n
k=1. (9)
4 This is the first-order stochastic dominance condition [1, 22]. Second and higher-order conditions refer to the situation, where there are
two different concepts related to the cost (or negative utility): money and its proper utility. We do not employ them here.
5 We stress the difference between majorization and stochastic dominance: in the latter the probabilities are not ordered, only the costs
are ordered as in (4). For majorization the probabilities should be ordered as in (5). Given this difference in orderings, both majorization
and stochastic dominance are defined by (7). Generally, the stochastic dominance does differ from majorization [1, 22].
6 The literature on mathematical economics suggests certain single-number measures of risk; see e.g., [23]. They do not apply for our
situation since they demand that E ≤ 0 (the average gain), but there are certainly some indices i for which εi > 0. This condition is
too restrictive for us. Ref. [24] presents another interesting attempt to go beyond the stochastic dominance conditions.
5For n = 3, (9) is equivalent to
(p1 − q1)(p3 − q3) > 0. (10)
These drawbacks motivate us to take (7) as a sufficient condition for risk, but still look for a single-function measure
of risk S[p1, ..., pn] such that if (7) holds, then
S[p1, ..., pn] ≤ S[q1, ..., qn]. (11)
While S[p1, ..., pn] is initially defined for ordered probabilities (5), it is natural to extend this definition by demanding
that S[p1, ..., pn] is invariant with respect to any permutation of its n arguments. Functions that hold these two
conditions—permutation invariance and that (8) implies (11)—are called Schur-concave7 [69]. For a differentiable
function to be Schur-concave it is necessary and sufficient that [69]
(pi − pj)
(
∂S
∂pi
−
∂S
∂pj
)
≤ 0. (12)
Naturally, the choice of a Schur-concave function as a measure of risk is not unique; hence certain additional conditions
are needed to fix it. Below we discuss one set of such conditions that allows us to fix entropy as a measure of risk
[70]. But before doing so, let us stress that a candidate Schur-concave function will in fact define the risk for {pk}
n
k=1
and {qk}
n
k=1 that hold (9). For illustration, let us take the simplest non-trivial case of n = 3. Now (10) shows that
the risk is to be defined between probabilities that have a conflict between giving more probability to the least-cost
action A1 or the less probability to the worst-cost action A3; i.e., we face a conflict between two different aspects of
risk-taking, to be resolved via a reasonable choice of the Schur-concave function S[p1, ..., pn]. Note in this context
that according to (12) there cannot be a differentiable S[p1, ..., pn] for which, e.g., S[p1, ..., pn] < S[q1, ..., qn] whenever
p3 = min[p1, p2, p3] < q3 = min[q1, q2, q3].
C. Entropy
Following [70, 72], we now outline several additional conditions that lead to choosing entropy among other Schur-
concave functions.
(A) S[p1, ..., pn] is additive with respect to the index k, i.e.,
S[p1, ..., pn] =
n∑
k=1
ψ(pk), (13)
with a smooth function ψ(x); cf. (14). Condition (13) can be motivated from demanding that if we compare
(p1, ..., pn) and (q1, ..., qn) with each other we want to draw conclusions from non-equal probabilities only. Likewise,
if pi and pj (1 ≤ i < j ≤ n) change as pi → pi + δ and pj → pj − δ with a suitable (but not necessarily small) δ,
we want the change of S[p1, ..., pn] to depend only on pi, pj and δ, but not on other probabilities pl with l 6= i
and l 6= j; see [32, 72] for further discussion of (13).
(B) The function ψ(x) is concave: d
2ψ
dx2 ≤ 0. This makes S[p1, ..., pn] =
∑n
k=1 ψ(pk) consistent with (7, 12), because
for any concave function ψ(x) relations (7) and (12) imply [69]
n∑
k=1
ψ(pk) ≤
n∑
k=1
ψ(qk). (14)
(C) Instead of actions A1, ...,An that refer (resp.) to probabilities p1, ..., pn, consider a composite set of actions
{AkA
′
l}
n n′
k=1 l=1 with probabilities (resp.) {pkp
′
l}
n n′
k=1 l=1. Hence {Ak}
n
k=1 is independent from {A
′
l}
n′
l=1; e.g.
{Ak}
n
k=1 and {A
′
l}
n′
l=1 may refer to the same set of actions performed independently at different times. It is
natural to demand from a risk measure S[...] that it adds up for independent actions [32, 72]:
S[p1p
′
1, ..., pnp
′
n′ ] = S[p1, ..., pn] + S[p
′
1, ..., p
′
n′ ]. (15)
7 Multiplying by minus one makes such a function Schur convex.
6Conditions (A–C) are natural for a measure of uncertainty—hence for a risk measure—and they lead to [70]:
ψ(p) = −p ln p, up to a positive multiplicative constant that we fixed to 1, and an additive constant that we fixed to
0 [70]. Thus the sought-after quantity amounts to the entropy
S[p] = −
n∑
k=1
pk ln pk. (16)
Eq. (14) means that entropy is larger for more risky probability. The expression (16) for the entropy can be recovered
via other axiomatic schemes; see [73, 74] for a review.
Thus, instead of conditions (7) we shall employ the entropy (16) as a measure of risk.8 Now the risk-averse agent
chooses to minimizes entropy (16) under constraints (2, 3):
min
[
−
n∑
k=1
pk ln pk; p1 ≥ ... ≥ pn ≥ 0,
∑
k
pkεk = E
]
, (17)
while the risk-seeking agent chooses in (17) max instead of min.
The maximization or minimization can be done via the Lagrange function
L = −
n∑
k=1
pk ln pk + βˆ
n∑
k=1
pkεk, (18)
where βˆ is the Lagrange multiplier that corresponds with E in (2). It is important to stress that (18) emerged as a
measure of risk and uncertainty in several alternative axiomatic schemes [52, 54–56]; see Appendix A for a discussion.
D. A general discussion on entropy maximization versus its minimization
The entropy maximization is a well-known method for determination of prior probabilities [31–37]. This method was
developed within statistical physics [38], and it reflects the second law of thermodynamics, i.e., the natural tendency
of the entropy to increase in closed systems [38]. The method was also motivated from within the probabilistic
inference theory [32–34], and applied to Bayesian decision making [35, 36], social group decision making [42], game
theory [43], and learning algorithms [44], where it describes bounded rational agents, etc. The entropy maximization
was also discussed from the viewpoint of approximate (and causal) reasoning [45–48]. The maximum entropy method
is fundamental for statistics, e.g., it was recently motivated from within the objective Bayesianism program [36, 37].
In social sciences the outcome of the entropy maximization method is known as the logit distribution; see [43, 44] for
reviews. Several basic features of entropy were related to the utility maximization in economics [49–51]. Mathematical
psychology and choice theory also provide interesting situations, where the agent behavior is determined by entropy
maximization for a fixed average utility; see [57] for a thorough review.
In contrast, the entropy minimization for a risk-averse agent is compared with a general trend of social and biological
systems that create order, i.e., decrease the entropy locally [58, 59]. Formalizations of such processes within statistical
physics are less known, but do exist [28–30]. Below we shall employ results from [30]. Occasionally, aspects of entropy
minimization are also discussed in probabilistic inference [39–41], e.g., for the feature extraction problem [40].
8 The use of entropy as a measure of risk was criticized in literature (see e.g., [23]) on the grounds that it depends only on probability and
not (also) on the costs εk. However, we note that the criticisms of [23] are not general, and it certainly does not apply to the situation
we consider, where both probabilities {pk}nk=1 and {qk}nk=1 refer to the same costs {εk}nk=1. Indeed, the argument of [23] against using
the entropy as a measure of risk refers (say) to comparing two situations, where within the first situation the agent gets 10$ and −10$
with probabilities p1 and p2. Within the second situation the agent gets 1000$ and −1000$ with the same probabilities p1 and p2. The
entropies here will be the same, −p1 ln p1 − p2 ln p2, but the risks are obviously different.
7IV. PRIOR PROBABILITIES VIA ENTROPY MINIMIZATION
A. Parametrization of probabilities
Here we discuss the minimization of entropy (16) under constraints (2, 3); see also [30] in this context. First, we
note that (3) and (2) are compatible only for
1
n
n∑
k=1
εk ≥ E =
n∑
k=1
pkεk. (19)
Indeed, we apply the summation-by-parts formula
n∑
k=1
pkεk = εn
n∑
k=1
pk −
n−1∑
m=1
[εm+1 − εm]
m∑
k=1
pk, (20)
to both sides of (19) and obtain:
n∑
k=1
1
n
εk −
n∑
k=1
pkεk =
n−1∑
m=1
[εm+1 − εm]
[
m∑
k=1
pk −
m∑
k=1
1
n
]
, (21)
Now (19) follows, because the first (second) term inside square brackets in (21) is non-negative due to (4) (due to
(5)). Using (4, 5) we parametrize the sought-after probabilities (p1, .., pn) as [30]
(p1, ..., pn) =
n∑
α=1
λαπα, πα ≡
1
α
(1....1︸ ︷︷ ︸
α
, 0, ..., 0), (22)
λα ≥ 0,
n∑
α=1
λα = 1, (23)
pk =
n∑
α=k
λα
α
, k = 1, ..., n. (24)
It is easy to show that (22) is necessary and sufficient for holding (3); see also (4). The advantage of using (22) is
that the probabilities λα do not have any other constraints besides (23) and (2) that in terms of λα are written as
E =
n∑
α=1
λαξα, (25)
ξα ≡
1
α
α∑
i=1
εi. (26)
B. Minimization of a concave function on a convex set
Note that constraints (5) and (2) define a convex set [13], which we denote by Ω. The same convex set, but in
different coordinates, is defined via (23) and (25). We now recall that the entropy S[p] in (16) is a concave function
of p = (p1, ..., pn) on Ω [31–34] [cf. (14)]:
S[χ p+ (1− χ) q] ≥ χS[p] + (1− χ)S[q], 0 ≤ χ ≤ 1, (27)
where q = (q1, ..., qn). Eq. (27) is well-known, but it can be verified by looking at an unconstrained Hessian matrix
(i.e., without accounting for constraints (5), (2)):
∂2S
∂pk ∂pl
= −
δkl
pk
, (28)
where δkl is a unit matrix. Once S is concave without the constraints, it is also concave on Ω.
8Now representation (22) implies that the entropy S is also a concave function of λα, e.g., takes derivatives over
λα and λβ as in (28). The non-constant concave function S[λ] (entropy in variables λα) on the convex set Ω can
reach its local minima only on vertices of Ω—i.e., those elements of Ω that cannot be represented as a convex sum
of other elements of Ω9 [13]. For those vertices λα = 0 for as many as possible indices α. Now for each vertex of Ω,
generically only two λ’s are non-zero; otherwise (25) cannot hold for a given E. (For particular values of E there can
be one non-zero λα). Let us take all n(n − 1)/2 vectors (23) with only two non-zero λα’s that are determined from
the normalization
∑n
α=1 λα = 1 in (23) and from (25). Now when minimizing the entropy on those vectors one finds
the global entropy minimum [30].
Note that the above concavity argument does not imply that all solutions are local minima with respect to an
infinitesimal perturbation that holds (2, 3).10 Nevertheless, it is the case that for the present problem all above
n(n−1)/2 solutions are local minima; see Appendix B for details. The local minimality is important because it makes
each solution meaningful even if it does not provide the global minimum of entropy. Note that choosing the global
minimum demands O(n(n− 1)/2) operations. This number scales polynomially with n.
Denote by {αβ} (α < β) the solution, where only λα ≡ λα and λβ = 1− λα are non-zero. For we get (25, 26):
E = λαξα + (1− λα)ξβ , λα =
ξβ − E
ξβ − ξα
, (29)
p1 = ... = pα =
λα
α
+
λβ
β
, pα+1 = ... = pβ =
λβ
β
, pβ+1 = ... = pn = 0. (30)
we get the minimized entropy from (16, 22, 23, 29, 30)
S{αβ}(E) = −ναβ ln
[ναβ
α
]
− (1− ναβ) ln
[
1− ναβ
β − α
]
, (31)
ναβ ≡ λα(1 −
α
β
) +
α
β
=
ξβ − E
ξβ − ξα
(1−
α
β
) +
α
β
. (32)
Now note from (4, 26) that [for α < β]
ξα − ξβ =
β − α
αβ
α∑
i=1
εi −
1
β
β∑
i=1+α
εi ≤
β − α
αβ
α∑
i=1
εi −
β − α
β
εα+1 =
β − α
αβ
α∑
i=1
[ εi − εα+1 ] ≤ 0. (33)
Hence, within solution {αβ} (α < β) we get [see (29)]
ξα ≤ E ≤ ξβ . (34)
Recall from (19) that the allowed range of E is ε1 = ξ1 ≤ E ≤ ξn.
C. Features of the minimized entropy
We obtain from (26–33)
dS{αβ}
dE
=
∂ναβ
∂E
∂S{αβ}
∂ναβ
=
1− α
β
ξβ − ξα
ln
[
ναβ
1− ναβ
β − α
α
]
=
1− α
β
ξβ − ξα
ln
[
1 +
β
α
ξβ − E
E − ξα
]
≥ 0, (35)
9 This fact follows from the negativity of the Hessian matrix, but can be shown as well directly: let λ0 be a local minimum of S[λ] that
is not a vertex of S. Then there exist λ1 and λ2, both from S, and both close to λ0 so that λ0 = χλ1 + (1 − χ)λ2, and 0 ≤ χ ≤ 1.
Now S[λ0] ≥ χS[λ1] + (1 − χ)S[λ2] from concavity of S[λ], and S[λ1] > S[λ0], S[λ2] > S[λ0], because λ0 is a local minimum. These
lead to S[λ0] > S[λ0], which is contradictory. Likewise, one can show that for a concave function S[λ] on a convex domain S, any local
maximum coincides with the global one. Let λl and λg be, respectively, the local and global maxima of S[λ]. Consider S[χλg+(1−χ)λl],
where 0 < χ < 1 is sufficiently close to 0. Then χλg + (1−χ)λl is close to the local maximum λl, but S[χλg + (1− χ)λl] ≥ S[λl], again
is a contradiction.
10 As an example consider a sphere intersected by a horizontal plane. The part of the plane that is inside of the sphere defines a convex
set, and the surface of the sphere is a concave function. Vertices of the set are intersection points of the sphere with the plane, but they
are not local minima.
9where (35) follows from (34). According to (35), S{αβ} is an increasing function of E within each solution {αβ},
hence also for the global minimum. Likewise, one can show from (35) that
d2S{αβ}
dE2
< 0, (36)
i.e., S{αβ}(E) is concave within each solution. Hence the global minimum min1≤α<β≤n[S{αβ}(E) ] is also a concave
function of E.
Eq. (34) shows that different local solutions exist for different values of E. Now solutions {αβ} (α > β) and {βγ}
(β < γ) can be glued together at E = ξβ so that the probabilities (30) behave continuously at E = ξβ ; cf. (29). Indeed,
at E = ξβ we get p1 = ... = pβ =
1
β
, pβ+1 = ... = pn = 0, both for {αβ} and {βγ}. The gluing operation is denoted
by ∨. The purpose of gluing is that local solutions are combined to cover the whole possible range ε1 = ξ1 ≤ E ≤ ξn
(of E) via continuous probabilities. For n = 3 there are two global solutions: {12} ∨ {23} and {13}. The entropies
are given as
S{12}∨{23}(E) =
{
S{12}(E) for ξ1 ≤ E ≤ ξ2,
S{23}(E) for ξ2 ≤ E ≤ ξ3,
(37)
and where S{αβ} is given by (31). For n = 4 we have: {12} ∨ {23} ∨ {34}, {12} ∨ {24}, {13} ∨ {34}, and {14}.
Within solution {1n} (e.g., {13} for n = 3) the action with the lowest cost ε1 is assigned the largest probability, while
all other actions have the same probability; see (22). This is indeed the simplest possible prescription that provides
non-zero probabilities for all utilities and holds for all possible values of E. The local minimum solution {1n} coincides
with the ǫ-greedy scheme from reinforcement learning [3]. It is seen to correspond to (at least) a local minimum of
entropy. The candidate solution {12} refers to the situation, where only the best and the second-best actions are
assigned non-zero probabilities. The validity range for this local minimum is restricted by ξ1 = ε1 ≤ E ≤ ξ2 =
ε1+ε2
2 .
Thus within the present set-up these two simple schemes of assigning non-deterministic prior probability appear
naturally. But in contrast to imposing them ad hoc, these schemes now have their validity conditions.
V. ENTROPY MAXIMIZATION FOR RISK-SEEKING AGENTS
Within the maximum entropy scheme, the risk-seeking agent will maximize over probabilities pk the entropy (16)
under constraint (25) [31–34]. This maximization starts from (18), and it produces the Gibbs-Boltzmann probabilities
[31–37] [cf. Footnote 9]:
pˆk =
1
Z
e−βˆεk , Z ≡
n∑
l=1
e−βˆεl , (38)
where βˆ is the Lagrange factor determined from E =
∑n
k=1 pˆkεk; cf. (2, 18). The sign of βˆ coincides with the sign
of 1
n
∑n
k=1 εk − E; see (19). Hence βˆ ≥ 0, since we assume the validity of (19). In statistical mechanics
11 βˆ refers to
inverse (absolute) temperature, and its positivity is a well-known fact [38].
It is not widely known in non-physical communities that the Gibbs-Boltzmann probabilities (38) have specific
responses to parameters, which were uncovered before statistical mechanics [38]. Below we recall some features of
(38) and compare them with the entropy minimization scheme.12
Note that the probabilities at the local entropy minimum {αβ} are not susceptible to changes of εγ (with γ > β)
that take place under a constant E; see (29–32). This differs from the Gibbs-Boltzmann probabilities (16) for the
risk-seeking agent, where changing any cost εk under a fixed E will change βˆ:
∂βˆ
∂εk
∣∣∣∣∣
E
=
pˆk[1 + βˆ(E − εk)]∑n
l=1 pˆl(εl − E)
2
, (39)
11 Probabilities in statistical mechanics can have an objective meaning; e.g., the Gibbs-Boltzmann probabilities (38) can refer to energy
occupations of a system in contact with a much larger thermal bath at temperature 1/βˆ [38]. But they can also have a subjective
meaning—e.g., when making predictions about a complex, closed system [38].
12 An alternative way of obtaining (38) is to fix the entropy (16) to a non-zero value Sˆ, and then minimize the average cost
∑n
k=1 pk εk.
Now βˆ in (38) is defined from a fixed value of entropy. In the context of our problem, this way of looking at (38) is not adequate, since
for us it is important that E is an independent variable that can be decided by the agent. However, in a different setting this way of
looking at (38) led to a definition of risk [26].
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where the derivative is taken under a constant E. Hence all the probabilities {pˆl}
n
l=1 will generally change including
when changing εk. Ratios pˆl/pˆm = e
−βˆ(εl−εm), where l 6= k and m 6= k, will change as well. This corresponds with the
fact that there is a single maximum entropy solution (38), while the entropy minimization produces several competing
local minima.
Another difference is that in the maximum entropy situation, as seen from (38)
εk ≈ εl implies pˆk ≈ pˆl. (40)
For the entropy minimizing situation, (40) is not neccesarily the case, as implied by (30), and as seen more explicitly
below in (51–53). Due to this feature the entropy minimizing solution is capable of detecting even small differences
between the costs. This is also one reason we insisted on strict inequalities in (4).
The maximized entropy is expressed from (38) as
Sˆ = −
n∑
k=1
pˆk ln pˆk = βˆE + lnZ. (41)
Differentiating (41) and employing
dβˆ
dE
= −
1∑n
k=1 pˆk(εk − E)
2
, (42)
obtained from
∑n
k=1 pˆkεk = E, we get
dSˆ
dE
= βˆ. (43)
Eq. (43) shows that for βˆ ≥ 0 (which holds due to (19)), Sˆ is an increasing function of E; cf. (35). Likewise, one
shows that Sˆ(E) is a concave function of E: d
2Sˆ
dE2 ≤ 0; cf. (36). Now using (41, 39) we find
∂Sˆ
∂εi
∣∣∣∣∣
E
= −βˆpˆi. (44)
It is seen that (44) is negative for β ≥ 0; cf. (19). Hence the uncertainty Sˆ decreases if one of the costs increases for
a fixed E. A similar feature holds as well for the minimized entropy in (31):
∂S{αβ}
∂εγ
∣∣∣∣
E
=
∂ναβ
∂εγ
∣∣∣∣
E
∂S{αβ}
∂ναβ
= (1 −
α
β
)
∂λα
∂εγ
∣∣∣∣
E
∂S{αβ}
∂ναβ
≤ 0. (45)
Inequality (45) follows from α < β (by definition of S{αβ}), from
∂λα
∂εγ
∣∣∣
E
≥ 0 (which can be shown easily from (29)),
and from
∂S{αβ}
∂ναβ
≤ 0, which is seen from (35). Eqs. (44, 45) imply an interesting feature of entropy optimization
that we explore below in more detail. A large cost εγ tends to be relevant (irrelevant) for entropy minimization
(maximization), since it decreases the entropy.
Using (38, 42) one can show that
∂pˆk
∂E
∣∣∣∣
{εi}ni=1
= −
dβˆ
dE
pˆk (εk − E). (46)
Due to dβˆdE ≤ 0, we get from (46) that the probabilities of sufficiently high (εk > E) costs increase upon increasing
E. This feature is both natural and expected: the more utility one is ready to invest (into adaptation), the more
higher-costs actions he explores. We shall see below that it need not hold for the entropy-minimizing agent.
Finally, we recall that there is a well-known freedom associated with the definition of costs εk [1]:
εk → aεk + b, (47)
where a > 0 and b are arbitrary. In particular, (47) means that probabilities assigned to a given set of actions should
not change, if all utilities (of those actions) are multiplied by a common positive factor a, and/or are shifted by a
common arbitrary number b. It is clear that the probabilities for both entropy minimization and entropy maximization
do hold (47); see in this context (29, 31, 32) and (38) and note that under (47), E also changes as E → aE + b.
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VI. EXAMPLES
A. Probabilities for three actions (n = 3)
Let us now study in detail the n = 3 situation (37): this is the simplest case that illustrates the difference between
maximizing entropy and minimizing it. Indeed, for n = 2 the probabilities p1 and p2 = 1−p1 are uniquely determined
by the contraint (2). Eqs. (22, 29) imply
{12} : (p1, p2, p3) =
(
1
2
+
λ{12}
2
,
1
2
−
λ{12}
2
, 0
)
, λ{12} =
ξ2 − E
ξ2 − ξ1
, (48)
{23} : (p1, p2, p3) =
(
1
3
+
λ{23}
6
,
1
3
+
λ{23}
6
,
1
3
−
λ{23}
3
)
, λ{23} =
ξ3 − E
ξ3 − ξ2
, (49)
{13} : (p1, p2, p3) =
(
1
3
+
2λ{13}
3
,
1
3
−
λ{13}
3
,
1
3
−
λ{13}
3
)
, λ{13} =
ξ3 − E
ξ3 − ξ1
. (50)
Recall that within {12} only the two smallest costs get non-zero probabilities; {23} prescribes equal probabilities to
those two smallest costs, while {13} gives equal probabilities to the two highest cost actions.
Using the freedom provided by (47), we fix ε1 = 0 and ε3 = 1; hence 0 < ε2 < 1. Now (48–50) simplify as follows:
{12} : (p1, p2, p3) =
1
ε2
(ε2 − E,E, 0) , 0 ≤ E ≤
ε2
2
, (51)
{23} : (p1, p2, p3) =
1
2− ε2
(1− E, 1− E, 2E − ε2) ,
ε2
2
≤ E ≤
1 + ε2
3
, (52)
{13} : (p1, p2, p3) =
1
1 + ε2
(1 + ε2 − 2E,E,E) , 0 ≤ E ≤
1 + ε2
3
. (53)
It is seen that (52) and (53) do not coincide with each other for ε2 → ε1 + 0 (ε1 = 0); cf. the discussion around (40).
Note that within each solution (51–53) increasing E leads to larger probabilities for costly actions 2 and 3. We
shall show below that this intuitively expected feature does not hold for transitions between different solutions (i.e.,
local minima of entropy).
For various parameter regimes we shall now compare the behavior of the risk-averse (entropy-minimizing) agent with
the risk-seeking (entropy-maximizing) one. Everywhere, such comparisons are made for the same values of {εk}
n
k=1
and the same value of E (where E is the utility invested into exploration). As seen below, entropy-minimizing
probabilities are neither majorized nor majorized by the entropy-maximizing ones, i.e., (9) and (10) are valid. This
fact makes the situation interesting, in particular because (for n = 3) there are two strategies for risk-aversion: putting
a larger weight on the lowest-cost action or a lesser weight on the highest-cost action; cf. our discussion after (12).
B. Two low-cost actions
In this regime two lower costs are approximately equal: ε1 ≈ ε2. Fig. 1 displays the entropies S{12}∨{23}(E) and
S{13}(E) for a representative set of parameters; see (37). It is seen that for ε1 ≈ ε2 the global minimum is always
{13}; cf. Fig. 1. Hence the corresponding probabilities are given by (53), where two actions with non-minimal costs
ε2 and ε3 are given the same weight.
In the regime {13} the entropy minimizing probabilities (53) hold [cf. Fig. 2]
{13} : p1 > pˆ1, (54)
p3 > pˆ3, (55)
where 0 < E < 1+ε23 , and pˆk are the Gibbs-Boltzmann probabilities (38). Hence (p1, p2, p3) neither majorizes
(pˆ1, pˆ2, pˆ3) nor is majorized by that, i.e., (54, 55) amount to a particular case of (10).
Now (54) means that the entropy-minimizing agent invests more probability on the lowest-cost action than the
entropy-maximizing one. This is one strategy for risk-aversion.13 Inequality (55) means that the entropy-minimizing
13 We can look at (54) from a different viewpoint. Recall that for E → ε1 = 0 both entropy-minimization and entropy-maximization
12
agent assigns to costly actions more probability than the entropy-maximizing agent. Note however that in the
considered regime ε1 ≈ ε2, where the solution {13} is the global minimum of energy we have (in addition to (55))
p1 − pˆ1 ≫ p3 − pˆ3, (56)
except E = 0 and E = 1+ε23 , where p1 − pˆ1 = p3 − pˆ3 = 0; cf. Fig. 2. However, if ε2 is sufficiently larger than ε1 = 0,
relation (56) need not hold—e.g., for 0.51 < ε2 < 0.68 and sufficiently small E, the global minimum of entropy is still
given by {13}. There we can have (together with (54, 55)): p3 − pˆ3 − (p1 − pˆ1) ≃ 0.01 > 0; i.e., though the difference
is relatively small it is still positive.
Another difference is that the entropy-minimizing (maximizing) agent tends to underweight (overweight) the middle-
cost action:
1 =
p3
p2
>
pˆ3
pˆ2
. (57)
The entropy-maximizing agent focuses on this middle-cost action and ignores the most costly action since it has
pˆ1 ≃ pˆ2 ≫ pˆ3; cf. Fig. 2.
Thus, the feature of {13} is that it puts more weight on the lowest-cost action—which is one possibility of risk-
aversion—and does account for highest-cost actions in the sense of (55, 57).
C. Two high-cost actions: distinguishing between actions with approximately equal costs
Let us now study the opposite case ε1 ≪ ε2 ≈ ε3 = 1. For a sufficiently small E the global minimum of entropy is
{12}; see Fig. 1. For the solution {12} ∨ {23} the inequalities (54, 55) are inverted:
{12} ∨ {23} : p1 < pˆ1, (58)
p3 < pˆ3. (59)
In this regime another strategy of risk-aversion is realized—the entropy-minimizing agent puts less weight on the
highest-cost action. In particular, for 0 ≤ E ≤ ε22 this action gets no probability at all: p3 = 0; see (48). Hence
when having two possibilities ε2 and ε3 with comparable high costs ε2 . ε3, the agent prefers the lesser of two evils.
In contrast, the entropy-maximizing agent will take these options with nearly equal probabilities. For larger values
of E, the global minimum is {23}, where all probabilities are non-zero, but the probability for the action with the
(intermediate) cost ε2 is as large as for the least-cost action: p2 = p1; see (49) and Figs. 1 and 3.
We see here an effect whose traces were also observed in the previous scenario: when choosing between two actions of
comparable cost ε2 ≈ ε3, the entropy-minimizing agent is able to distinguish between them despite a small difference.
In contrast to this, the entropy-maximizing agent will just take them with (approximately) equal probability, neglecting
that small difference.
D. Transitions from one regime to another, re-entrance, cognitive dissonance and frustration
1. Transition between {13} and {12} upon increasing E
So far we studied cases ε1 ≈ ε2 ≪ ε3 = 1 and ε1 ≪ ε2 ≈ ε3 = 1, where one (global) solution—respectively, {13}
and {12} ∨ {23}—provides the global entropy minimum for all values of E. Now we turn to studying cases, where
ε1 6≈ ε2 and ε3 6≈ ε2. Here it is possible to have transitions between different local minima upon changing E; see
Fig. 1 with the case ε2 = 0.33.
For a sufficiently small E the global minimum is {13}. But for E > 0.15, the global minimum becomes {12}. This
transition from one regime to another is continuous in terms of entropy, but discontinuous in terms of probabilities
produce: p1 → 1 and pˆ1 → 1, i.e., they converge (as they should) to taking the least-cost action. Now one can ask to which extent this
least-cost action is stable (p˜1, p˜2, p˜3) = (1, 0, 0) with respect to a small, but non-zero E. This question can be addressed by looking at one
of standard distances between probabilities, e.g., the variational distance ∆1[p(E), p˜] ≡ 12
∑3
k=1 |pk(E) − p˜k| or the Hellinger distance
∆2[p(E), p˜] ≡ 1 −
∑3
k=1
√
pk(E) p˜k. It is clear that ∆1[pˆ(E), p˜] −∆1[p(E), p˜] = p1 − pˆ1 and ∆2[pˆ(E), p˜]−∆2[p(E), p˜] = √p1 −
√
pˆ1.
Now (54) and Fig. 1 show that for a small but non-zero E we have ∆k[pˆ(E), p˜] > ∆k[p(E), p˜] (k = 1, 2), i.e. the least-cost action is
more stable for the entropy minimizing agent.
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for various actions, as seen from (48–50). This is an analogue of the first-order phase transition in statistical physics
systems (e.g., the liquid-vapor transition) [38], where the role of E is played by the (physical) temperature. There the
thermodynamic potential whose minimization determines stability (for our case this is entropy) changes continuously,
but the order parameter (the difference between densities of liquid and vapor) suffers a discontinuous change [38].
The transition at E = 0.15 is against naive intuition, because with a larger average cost E the agent neglects the
action ε3, which is related to the highest cost. Here the agent who invests less into adaptation assigns more probability
to costly actions. For the entropy-maximizing agent it is impossible that the probability of the most costly action
decreases upon increasing E; cf. our discussion around (46). For the entropy-minimizing agent such an effect does
take place—the probability p3 of the most costly state changes from a positive value to zero—due to transition from
one local minimum to another. For changes within the local minimum this cannot happen, as seen from (51–53). This
effect can be related to cognitive dissonance [60–62] 14.
2. Re-entrance
However, the above transition from {13} to {12} upon increasing E is not the end of the story: at E = 0.165
(and ε2 = 0.33) the solution {12} continuously (both in terms of entropy and probabilities) changes to {23}. This
is a natural transition: for E > 0.165, the solution {12} does not exist anymore, since it cannot hold the constraint
E = p2ε2; cf. (34). This is an analogue of a second-order phase transition in statistical physical systems (e.g.,
paramagnetic-ferromagnetic transition in magnets) [38], where one solution ceases to exist and is replaced by another
via a continuous change of the order parameter (magnetization, in our case probabilities of actions).15
But eventually, for E > 0.18, the global minimum is back from {23} to {13} (re-entrance). The probabilities of the
solution {13} stay almost constant in the whole interval 0.15 ≤ E ≤ 0.18. Note that the re-entrance effect persists
up to ε2 ≤ 0.45. For 0.68 > ε2 > 0.45 (not shown on figures) the re-entrance behavior is absent; there is only a single
transition from {13} to {12} upon increasing E. Eventually, for 0.68 < ε2 the global entropy minimum is always
{12} ∨ {23}, and we revert to the studied regime ε1 ≪ ε2 ≈ ε3 = 1.
The transitions from {13} to {12}∨{23} and back mean that there are three local minima with comparable values of
entropy but different values for probabilities of actions; cf. Fig.1. They compete with each other upon relatively small
changes of E. This effect resembles frustration, whose psychological content is that there are two (or more) different
(incommensurate) goals or motivations that compete with one other. The concept of frustration is also well-known
in statistical physics of complex systems (see [71] for a recent review), where its meaning is very close to the above,
since it relates to competing local minima of the thermodynamic potential (entropy in our case).
We stress that neither of the above effects is seen for the risk-seeking agent, because in this situation probabilities (38)
are unique and depend smoothly on the parameters involved. This has to do with the fact that (38) was obtained via
maximization of a concave function in a convex set, which generically produces unique and well-behaved results [13].
Possible non-uniqueness of the Gibbs-Boltzmann probabilities (38) can show up only in the thermodynamic limit
n → ∞ for specific systems that can be subject to phase-transitions. (We however refrain from considering the
n→∞ case, since it is far from an agent facing a limited amount of different choices.)
E. Four actions
We turn to the entropy-minimizing scenarios for n = 4. We do so briefly, because though n = 4 is richer then
n = 3, it does not offer conceptual novelties. Here we also fix ε1 = 0 and ε4 = 1 [cf. (47)], and we are left with
two parameters: 0 < ε2 < ε3 < 1. For ε2 ≈ ε3 ≈ 1 the global minimum of entropy is provided by the solution
14 It is characterized by the following feature: the more energy and/or effort people invest into some situation, the narrower the set of
their actions or intentions tends to become. (This narrowing was described theoretically within probabilisitic opinion formation [63].)
E.g. the more (possessions and/or time) people invest into a sectarian movement, the more vigorously they tend to support it [60–62].
Another example: once people already buy something, they tend to have fewer doubt about its value and relevance. The above behavior
of the entropy-minimizing agent agrees with cognitive dissonance—the more utility the agent decides to invest into adaptation (i.e., E
increases), and the narrower his action set tends to become. The underlying cause of this effect in our situation also relates to one of
the phenomenological features of cognitive dissonance [60, 61]; that is, people tend to minimize the uncertainty in their action (belief
or intention) set, which for our situation refers to minimizing entropy (uncertainty). Within the cognitive dissonance theory these
two aspects—namely that investing more means believing more and uncertainty minimization—are related to each other other on the
grounds of a general plausibility [60, 61]. Here we see that they are related to each directly, and risk minimization explains this relation.
15 We emphasize that a normal understanding of phase-transitions relates them to the case n→∞. This condition is however not necessary
for having a phase-transition, e.g., in a micro-canonical ensemble [38].
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{12} ∨ {23} ∨ {34}. It has the same meaning as above: among actions of comparable cost the risk-minimizing agent
chooses the one with the lowest cost (i.e., p2 > 0, but p3 = p4 = 0) for ξ1 ≤ E ≤ ξ2. Now this solution does not exist
for ξ2 ≤ E ≤ ξ3. In this regime the agent takes the solution {23}, where p2 > 0, p3 > 0, but p4 = 0. For ε2 ≈ ε3 ≪ 1
the global minimum is {14}, as expected. Now p2 = p3 = p4 > 0. These two regimes are similar to those for n = 3.
For ε1 ≈ ε2 ≪ ε3 ≈ ε4 the global minimum {14} for a relatively low E changes to {13} ∨ {34} for a large E. Finally,
when both ε2 and ε3 are close to 0.5, there is a sequence of transitions from one solution to another, such that every
solution becomes a global minimum for a certain E; e.g., for ε2 = 0.4 and ε3 = 0.5 we observe the following transitions
upon increasing E: {14} → {12} → {24} → {23} → {34}.
VII. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
An agent who wants to be adaptive in choosing between several actions in a varying and complex environment
cannot exclusively focus on the least-cost action. The agent should also explore actions with non-minimal costs, and
not only exploit the action with the minimal cost. This is the known exploration-exploitation trade-off, which exists
in various forms and fields. We here worked out a set-up that allows us to study the trade-off within decision-making.
The agent faces several actions, whose initial costs are known, but it is not known how they will change given the
time and actions of the agent. Now the agent needs to perform several actions so that if there is a regular information
about costs, then this information can be gathered. With which probabilities should he choose initial actions in such
an agnostic situation?
We worked out one possibility, where the exploration goes via risk-minimization—a heuristic rule that people
frequently apply in uncertain situations. Risk is a wide notion that appears in various situations. In particular,
both risk-minimization (aversion) and risk-maximization are seen in experiments with people gambling on uncertain
monetary outcomes [12].
In our situation the treatment of risk is easier than usual (cf. [22–24]) because we compare agents that have the same
costs for their actions and decide to invest the same amount of average utility into exploration, i.e., into not taking
the least-cost action only. We start with the stochastic dominance (or majorization) condition, which constraints
specific risk measures. Given certain standard constraints, we show that the entropy can be employed as a measure
of risk. This result is obtained via several different axiomatization schemes; see section III. Thus the risk-averse
(risk-seeking) agent will minimize (maximize) the entropy given the average utility invested into adaptation, and also
the constraint that more costly actions should get less probability. There are two different strategies of risk aversion:
putting more probability on low-cost vs. high-cost actions. These strategies are different, and they relate to a rich
behavior spectrum even in the simplest case of three actions.
While the entropy maximization is a well-known rule in probabilistic inference [31–40], the entropy minimization
is an under-explored idea; cf. [28–30, 39, 40, 58, 59]. We show that this method can lead to useful predictions,
e.g., it recovers (under definite conditions) the ǫ-greedy probability known in reinforcement learning theory [3]. Our
main result is that the entropy-minimizing agent (in contrast to the entropy-maximizing one) shows certain aspects of
intelligent behavior: (i) taking into account costly actions; (ii) choosing the best alternative among two comparable
ones; (iii) cognitive dissonance.
Within (i) the entropy-minimizing (risk-averse) agent puts more probability into the least-cost action than the
risk-seeking (entropy-maximizing) agent, and distributes the remainder such that the largest-cost action gets more
probability than the risk-seeking agent; see (54, 55). Empirically, this scenario coincides with the ǫ-greedy strat-
egy known in reinforcement learning [3], but now it is derived—together with its validity conditions—from a more
general principle of entropy minimization. Overall, this scenario resembles the behavior of a scientist who follows
the incremental character of any science—hence devotes most of his time to traditional, low-cost subjects but is still
open-minded enough to venture on alternatives that have higher costs of implementation and recognition.
When choosing between two actions with comparable cost, the entropy-minimizing agent chooses to put a higher
probability on the lower-cost action; cf. (ii). We find this to be a (rudimentary) scientific attitude. The progress of
science does relate to noting small differences in experiments and/or in theory; e.g. successful scientists are prone to
see potential contradictions that are ignored by others. Also, modern theories of physics (e.g., quantum mechanics)
are based on small experimental differences between their predictions and those of classical physics. In contrast, the
entropy-maximizing agent gives approximately the same probability for actions with close costs.
The entropy-minimizing agent also demonstrates cognitive dissonance: by increasing the amount of utility E invested
into adaptation, this agent tends to nullify probabilities of high-cost actions. This effect relates to the fact that the
minimization of entropy produces several local minima that compete with each other (frustration). Within the
cognitive dissonance theory this effect is taken as a general sign of a loosely defined cognitive consistency. We relate
it with risk-minimization.
We mention that maximizing the entropy of probability paths was proposed as a scheme for the emergence of
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intelligent behavior [64]. Though the mathematical details of the original proposal are unclear [65], the proposal
was generalized to social collective systems [66], and formalized within the convex analysis [67]. We stress however
that within the set-up studied here, the entropy maximization did not show features of intelligent behavior. Further
work is needed to connect the presented research with the ones reported in [64, 66, 67]. There are also proposals of
employing entropy minimization for improving the performance of machine learning algorithms [68]. Future research
may clarify relations of this proposal with the presented results.
Another open problem is how to modify/continue the presented theory for applying it to problems of creativity
modeling. One difference here is that in creative task solving it is the action space that has to be conceived and
understood, while in various types of decision theories the action space is fixed. As examples show,16 even with this
serious difference there are clear analogies between creative task solving and the exploration-exploitation dilemma.
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FIG. 1: (Color online) The locally minimal entropies S{12}∨{23}(E) (red curves) and S{13}(E) (blue curves) as functions of E
for n = 3; see (37). Using (47) we fixed for costs: ε1 = 0, 0 < ε2 < 1, and ε3 = 1.
Dotted curves: ε2 = 0.1. The blue curve is always lower: S{12}∨{23}(E) > S{13}(E); hence the local minimum {13} is the
global entropy minimum.
Full curves: ε2 = 0.33. Now the blue and red curves intersect two times: the local minimum {13} is not the global one for
0.15 ≤ E ≤ 0.18. The transition from {12} to {23} takes place at E = 0.165.
Dashed curves: ε2 = 0.8. Now the red curve is always lower, S{12}∨{23}(E) < S{13}(E), meaning that the solution {12} ∨ {23}
is the global minimum.
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FIG. 2: (Color online) Probabilities as a function of E for the n = 3 situation with ε1 = 0, ε2 = 0.1 and ε3 = 1. Full curves:
pˆ1 (black), pˆ2 (magenta), pˆ3 (green). Dotted curves: p1 (black), p2 = p3 (green).
The Gibbs-Boltzmann probabilities pˆk for the risk-seeking agent are calculated from (38). The probabilities {pk}
3
k=1 refer to
{13} [see (53)], which is the global minimum for the present values of εk; cf. Fig. 1.
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FIG. 3: (Color online) The same as in Fig. 2, but now ε1 = 0, ε2 = 0.8 and ε3 = 1. Dotted curves refer to the solution
{12} ∨ {23} [see (52)], which is now the global minimum: p1 (black), p2 (magenta; note that p2 = p3 for E ≥ ξ2 =
ε2
2
= 0.4),
and p3 (green; we have p3 = 0 for E ≤ ξ2 =
ε2
2
= 0.4).
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Appendix A: Alternative route to constrained entropy optimization
The purpose of this Appendix is to outline an alternative method for obtaining entropy as a measure of risk and
uncertainty; see (18). Recall that optimization (i.e., minimization or maximization) of entropy (16) under constraint
(2) can be done via the optimization of the Lagrange function
L = −
n∑
k=1
pk ln pk + βˆ
n∑
k=1
pkεk, (A1)
where βˆ is the Lagrange multiplier that corresponds with E in (2). Following [52] we shall mention an approach that
allows us to recover directly (A1) via few reasonable axioms. This is useful as an alternative (and more direct) route
to optimizing entropy under (2).
Let us reinterpret actions A1, ...,An in (1) as events of a classical probability space. One seeks a measure
Ln(A1, p1; ...;An, pn) of uncertainty (or risk) that depends on both the probabilities and the corresponding events
and that hold the following axioms [52]:
(a) Ln(A1, p1; ...;An, pn) is symmetric with respect to any permutation of n elements (z1, ..., zn), where zk = (Ak, pk).
(b) Ln(A1, p1; ...;An, pn) holds the branching feature
Ln(A1, p1; ...;An, pn) = Ln−1(A1 ∪ A2, p1 + p2;A3, p3; ...;An, pn) + (p1 + p2)L2(A1,
p1
p1 + p2
;A2,
p2
p1 + p2
).(A2)
This is a natural feature for an uncertainty, where joining to events A1 and A2 (thus p1+p2 is the joint probability)
leaves the residual uncertainty L2(A1,
p1
p1+p2
;A2,
p2
p1+p2
) with conditional probabilities p1
p1+p2
and p2
p1+p2
for A1 and
A2, respectively.
(c) Ln(A1, p1; ...;An, pn) is a continuous function of p1, p2, ..., pn.
The three axioms lead to [52]:
Ln(A1, p1; ...;An, pn) = −
n∑
k=1
pk ln pk + γˆ
n∑
k=1
pkεk(Ak), (A3)
where εk(Ak) is an arbitrary function of Ak, and γˆ is an arbitrary constant. (An irrelevant additive constant was fixed
to zero). Interpreting εk(Ak) as the cost related to Ak, and equating γˆ = βˆ we revert from (A3) to (A1). Eq. (A3)
and many related results can be proved via the functional equations methods reviewed in [53].
Note, that expressions similar to (A3), i.e., a convex combination of entropy and expected cost (negative utility)
were proposed in [54, 55] as a measure of risk. Refs. [54, 55] employ this measure for elucidating several controversies
in the decision theory. The same measure was axiomatically deduced and studied in [56]. Taking into account the
axiomatic development, one can say that the measure of risk (A3) expressed by a linear combination of entropy and
expected cost does have normative features.
Appendix B: Local minimality of solutions (29).
The aim of this Appendix is to show that the solutions for entropy minimization given by (29) do provide local
minima of entropy. This is an important point, because once the local minimality is established, the solutions become
meaningful even if they do not provide the global entropy minimum. To illustrate ideas, we start with the simplest
non-trivial situation.
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1. n = 3
To check the local minimality we represent the probabilities of different actions as [see (22)]
p1 = µ1 +
µ2
2
+
µ3
3
+ λ1 +
λ2
2
+
λ3
3
, (B1)
p2 =
µ2
2
+
µ3
3
+
λ2
2
+
λ3
3
, (B2)
p3 =
µ3
3
+
λ3
3
, (B3)
p1 ≥ p2 ≥ p3, (B4)
where the unperturbed probabilities are [see (25, 26)]
λ1 + λ2 + λ3 = 1, (B5)
λ1ξ1 + λ2ξ2 + λ3ξ3 = E, (B6)
and where small perturbations µk hold
µ1 + µ2 + µ3 = 0, (B7)
µ1ξ1 + µ2ξ2 + µ3ξ3 = 0. (B8)
We recall from (33) that
ξ1 ≤ ξ2 ≤ ξ3. (B9)
To check the local minimality of the first solution we take λ2 = 0 in (B1–B3). Now (B4) demands [in addition to
(B7, B8)]
µ2 > 0. (B10)
Now we have for the entropy changes due to the perturbation:
∆S = −
3∑
k=1
pk ln pk +
3∑
k=1
pk|µl=0 ln pk|µl=0 (B11)
= −
3∑
k=1
(pk − pk|µl=0) ln pk|µl=0 (B12)
= −(µ1 +
µ2
2
+
µ3
3
) ln
[
p1|µl=0
p2|µl=0
]
(B13)
=
2µ2
3
[
ξ3 − ξ2
ξ3 − ξ1
−
1
4
]
ln
[
p1|µl=0
p2|µl=0
]
, (B14)
where in (B12) we kept only the linear order over µl, and where we employed (B7, B8) in (B13) and in (B14). Due to
(B10) and to ln
[
p1|µl=0
p2|µl=0
]
≥ 0, we get that ∆S > 0 (we are looking for the local minimum of entropy) is achieved for
ξ3 − ξ2
ξ3 − ξ1
>
1
4
. (B15)
This inequality always holds, once one recalls the definition of ξk; see (26, 4).
To check the local minimality of the second solution we take λ1 = 0 in (B1–B3). Now (B4) demands [in addition
to (B7, B8)]
µ1 > 0. (B16)
Repeating the same steps as in (B11–B14), we get
∆S =
µ1
3
ξ2 − ξ1
ξ3 − ξ2
ln
[
p2|µl=0
p3|µl=0
]
> 0, (B17)
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i.e. this solution is local minimum (without additional conditions) due to (B16), ln
[
p2|µl=0
p3|µl=0
]
> 0 and (B9).
For the third solution we take λ3 = 0 in (B1–B3). Now (B4) demands [in addition to (B7, B8)]
µ3 > 0. (B18)
We get instead of (B17)
∆S = O(µ3) +
µ3
3
ln
[
3 e p2|µl=0
µ3
]
> 0. (B19)
This expression is always non-negative, whenever µ3 > 0 is sufficiently small. Thus all solutions are always local
minima.
2. n > 3
We now turn to the more general situation and write probabilities as
pk =
n∑
l=k
µl
l
+
n∑
l=k
λl
l
, k = 1, ..., n, (B20)
p1 ≥ p2 ≥ ... ≥ pn, (B21)
n∑
l=k
µl = 0, (B22)
n∑
l=k
ξlµl = 0, (B23)
where µl are perturbations. Now the unperturbed solution is defined by only two non-zero elements in {λα}
n
α=1 ≥ 0:
λα and λβ . Eq. (B21) then implies that besides µα and µβ all other µk are necessarily non-negative:
µk ≥ 0, k 6= α, k 6= β. (B24)
Using (B22, B23), µα and µβ are expressed as
µα =
n∑
k=1,k 6=α,k 6=β
µk
ξk − ξβ
ξβ − ξα
, µβ =
n∑
k=1,k 6=α,k 6=β
µk
ξk − ξα
ξα − ξβ
. (B25)
Eqs. (B25) imply that if at least one pk|µl=0 equals to zero, the corresponding solution is locally stable via the same
mechanism as in (B19).
Solutions for which pk|µl=0 > 0 can be studied on the case-by-case basis. For the solution with λ1 > 0 and λn > 0
we obtain from (B25) [cf. (B11)]:
∆S = −
n∑
k=1
(pk − pk|µl=0) ln pk|µl=0 (B26)
= ln
[
p1|µl=0
p2|µl=0
]
n− 1
n
n−1∑
k=2
µk
{
ξn − ξk
ξn − ξ1
−
n− k
k(n− 1)
}
(B27)
Now using (26, 4) for ξk one can show directly that all the curly brackets in (B27) are non-negative, which together
with (B24) and (B21) implies ∆S ≥ 0, i.e., this solution is a local minimum of entropy. Generalizing this argument
we converge to a conclusion that all the solutions are local minima.
